This book is aimed at academics in the field of international law, with a particular focus on the EU, its composition, and its politics. It is an excellent research tool that provides a wealth of information on the topic addressed in the title, *The EU as a Polity*, primarily by examining the term “security” in a broad sense. It also provides scope for further research by suggesting additional questions that could be addressed. It considers the uniqueness of the EU as a regional group and whether the EU is, in fact, a polity—that is, a political entity with collective goals and the capacity to assemble resources, organized by some form of institutional hierarchy. It does not define this concept until the end of the book; it would be useful to have this definition at the beginning so that readers could reflect on it as the discussion develops. The book considers the hurdles that the EU may face both in becoming and in functioning as such a polity. The examination is thorough and does answer the questions that it sets out to address. Importantly, the EU is considered both as part of, but also distinct from, the domestic sphere of law. ‘It possesses its own norms, principles, institutions which respond, at least in part, to a logic that is separate from and overlapping with the domestic legal framework.’ (page 2). EU law has primacy, but that does not mean that national law is invalidated; rather, national law is disapplied (page 11). This is one of the arguments used by the author to dismiss federalist claims concerning the shift in sovereign power from the national to the EU level. He also asserts that the argument in the book is ‘neither purely legal, nor purely political – but crosses both fields, because the EU is considered simultaneously as a legal system/order and as a polity’ (page 29). Therefore, the theoretical approaches within the book move from black-letter law to socio-legal analysis in places.

Alina Averchenkova, Sam Fankhauser, and Michal Nachmany, eds. Trends in Climate Change Legislation. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017. ISBN 978-1-78643-577-4.

Summary. For the Crime of Genocide, mens rea plays a significant role. The two assessed criminal cases—Goran Jelisić and Momčilo Krajišnick—demonstrate the difficulty in proving the level of intent as a means of convicting genocide criminals. Special intent is hard to prove in the court of law, and perpetrators can disguise genocidal acts to avoid conviction. The systematic genocidal violence aimed at the Rohingya population in Myanmar also shows the difficulty in proving special intent. It is recommended that the revision proposed by Alexander Greenawalt, that both the meaning and interpretation of intent from ‘purpose-based’ to ‘knowledge-based’ perspective, is necessary. More importantly, the paper suggests steps which can potentially bring these atrocities to an end, inlcuding labelling them what they are, a ‘genocide.’

Ronald Dworkin’s Life’s Dominion has set the tone of jurisprudential discourse on the ethics of abortion. Dworkin, addresses the basis of the debate over the morality of abortion. However, he does so from an uncommon lens. He is not concerned with whether abortion should be morally permissible or not. Instead Dworkin asks, ‘Why does a large section of society vehemently oppose abortion?’. Dworkin claims that abortion is opposed because it violates the intrinsic value or ‘sacredness’ bestowed in any living being, fetus or adult. This is significant because our understanding of the moral-ethical basis of the abortion debate greatly influences abortion laws all over the world which allow or prohibit it. In this context, I deconstruct Dworkin’s theory. Dworkin’s account of what makes things sacred fails to explain why human life is special. He fails to distinguish the sacredness of human life as something more than the life of a tree or caterpillar. Specifically, I propose that a better way of understanding opposition to abortion is to acknowledge the potential personhood of the fetus which illicit strong protective sentiments in individuals, who then go on to oppose abortion.

The unprecedented and growing amount of predictive information we can draw from an individual’s genetic data poses serious threats to fundamental human rights for a number of reasons. Large-scale whole genome sequencing and data sharing, enabled by technological advancements, are ongoing internationally. The extent of data availability, and genetic data being the ‘gold mines’ of the 21st century, has led to large-scale data breaches being regular and unavoidable. The traditional protective measure – anonymisation of data – is ineffective in preventing re-identification of individuals. Moreover, genetic data are useful for more than a generation. Therefore, once information is extracted from genetic data and is in possession of potential misusers, even the discarding of sequenced genomes does not protect individuals from the numerous potential misuses of genetic information. Protection provided by the law is either non-existent or scattered across a number of legislations even in countries with recently updated laws, with fundamental rights being under threat. This threat is particularly imminent in developed economies, as genomic testing is becoming common and genomic medicine a reality. To protect individuals, societies must enact specific laws to regulate existing and anticipated uses of genetic information.

The obligation of States to not use force against other States is now well established in international law both on land and at sea. Unless authorized by the Security Council or based on self-defence, non-compliance with this rule is a breach of international law and may give rise to State responsibility for wrongful act. The same cannot be argued about States’ behaviour towards non-State actors. An example comes from the area of contested waters, where private oil companies authorized by one of the disputing States may be forcibly evicted or have their personnel detained by the other disputant with acts which exceed the limits of law enforcement. International law of the sea fails to determine the legality of such behaviour and the means by which the affected private actor may respond. But insofar as the law does not explicitly oblige States to respect private actors and prevents the latter from submitting personal claims to international fora, private interests in contested waters will remain unprotected against unlawful State acts.

Contradictory Practices of Turkish Courts With Respect to Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards